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INTRODUCTION
Dean Anthony Kronman of the Yale Law School has
produced one of the most widely discussed contemporary
critiques of legal practice and, specifically, of legal education.'
This commentary will focus on Dean Kronman's central
notion of practical wisdom.2 We begin with a preliminary
question: Is there really such an identifiable thing as practical
wisdom, as described and elaborated by Kronman? This
cannot simply be taken for granted. After all, many of us were
at one point convinced of the reality of phlogiston' or of the
aether through which light propagates.4 It is also possible that
the practically wise person might exist without being readily or
reliably detectable. So if we assume that practical wisdom,
precisely as Kronman develops the idea, does exist, we should
still ask whether a client, a group of persons, or a society can
consistently recognize the possession or exercise of genuine
practical wisdom by specific persons. We may call this problem
that of identifying the phronimoi, or those persons who exercise
practical wisdom.5
Once we have disposed of this preliminary question, we
will turn to the law school context specifically. We ask wheth-
er, as Kronman argues, the traditional Socratic appellate case
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University. A.B., Virginia,
1972; M.A_, Indiana, 1974; Ph.D., Indiana, 1976;J.D., Indiana, 1982. The author wishes
to thank the participants in this Symposium, as well as Stephen Becker, Tom Berg, Lori
Hackleman, Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., Gina Hunter, Mary Krohn, Trisha Olson, Deborah
Rhode, Kimberly Schooley, Tom Shaffer, Karl Shoemaker, and Howard Walthall, Jr.
I ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993). For an account resonating at certain points with that of Dean Kronman, see
MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994).
Kronman introduces the idea of practical wisdom in THE LOST LAWYER at 15-16.
See Jeremy Waldron, On the Objectivity of Morals: Thoughts on Gilbert's Democratic
Individuality, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1361, 1374 (1992); Rex J. Zedalis, On First Considering
Whether Law Binds, 69 IND. L.J. 137, 152 n.51 (1993).
' See Zedalis, supra note 3, at 153 n.51; Robert M. Gordon, Note, McLean v. Arkansas
Board of Education: Finding the Science in "Creation Science, "77 Nw. U. L. REv. 374, 396
n.127 (1982); Janice Toran, 'Tis A Gft to Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89
MICH. L. REV. 352, 352 n.1 (1990).
5 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 176.
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method, when well practiced, tends distinctively to promote
the development of practical wisdom as specifically envisioned
by Kronman. At this point, we then pose our final question. It
seems hard to object, in the abstract, to the general idea of
practical wisdom. But Kronman develops and elaborates a
particular conception of practical wisdom. We might see value
in the general idea of practical wisdom without endorsing
Kronman's specific account. So we must ask, finally, whether
we ought to promote practical wisdom as conceived of by
Kronman, in light of any available alternatives.
Let us begin, then, with only a very generalized and
incomplete sketch of the meaning of practical wisdom for
Kronman. We can add controversy when we later add some
further detail. One way to start is by assuming that the
practically wise lawyer deliberates and judges well. For Kron-
man, deliberating and judging well is a dualistic process.
Deciding what to do, or how to resolve a case, requires on the
one hand a measure of disinterest, dispassion, neutrality, or
disengagement.6 The practical decisionmaker must not fully
embrace or internalize the particular values, perceptions, or
interests of any party.7 This aspect of practical decisionmaking
may be called the moment of detachment. For Kronman, the
moment of detachment must, on the other hand, be comple-
mented by imaginative identification, sympathy, and compas-
sion.8 This we may call the moment of imaginative empathy.9
Kronman observes that "the more developed a person's
imagination the wider the range of solutions he can envision
to any particular problem ....
Practical wisdom as a virtue inescapably involves percep-
tion and reflection" as well as knowledge,12 and takes the
form of a stable trait of character."i Kronman in this fashion
develops the initial dualism of detachment and imaginative
6 See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 792
(1983).
7 See id.
8 See id. See also Anthony T. Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional Character, 4
SOCIAL PHIL. & POL'Y 203, 221 (1986).
9 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 104-05.
'0 Kronman, supra note 8, at 217.
" See id. at 210.
12 See id. at 207.
13 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 15.
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empathy.14 Kronman goes on to suggest that even if we were
to assume that all intellectual abilities are equally distributed
within a population, this would not imply that practical
wisdom is distributed equally among persons. Practical wisdom
is "a trait of character and not simply an intellectual skill."'"
Surely we cannot claim that all character traits, including, for
example, bravery or cowardice, are distributed equally among
all persons. Kronman holds that "some citizens have a superior
ability to discern the public good.., due to their excellence
of judgment.... "16
For Kronman, the virtue of practical wisdom is of course
not simply innate or merely a function of age. Practical
wisdom can, to some degree, be developed through teaching.
Kronman argues that in law schools, the appellate case law
teaching method, involving the traditional Socratic dialogue,
can promote the character trait or virtue of practical wis-
dom. In fact, "the aim of the Socratic method is to teach
practical wisdom"18 to prospective attorneys. Kronman argues
that developing practical wisdom is important, if only because
it is risky for an attorney to seek fulfillment through money,
power, or even the zealous advocacy of the cause of social
justice,19 while neglecting the professional exercise of practi-
cal wisdom.
I. Is THERE REALLY SUCH A THING AS PRACTICAL WISDOM AS
DESCRIBED AND ELABORATED BY KRONMAN, AND How CAN WE
IDENTIFY IT?
One initial problem we must face is that the idea of
practical wisdom, and the related broader idea of practical
reason, have not had a single, unequivocal meaning from
14 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
15 KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 35.
11 Id. For an endorsement of Kronman's defense of the existence and recognizability
of an unequally distributed, reasonably stable character trait of practical wisdom, see Gail
Heriot, Songs of Experience, 81 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (1995) (reviewing ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
17 See Kronman, supra note 8, at 227.
18 1d
19 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 365-68. Certainly, a career of unchallenging,
routinized, or unduly stressful service of even a worthy social cause may in some respects
fall short of intrinsic fulfillment or character development. For discussion of Kronman
on this point, see Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Lawyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759,
1767 (1993); Michael Livingston, Confessions of an Economist Killer: A Reply to Kronman's
"Lost Lawyer,"89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1592, 1595-96 (1995).
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Aristotle's time to our own.2 ' There is, however, enough of
a consensus on some basic elements of Aristotle's influential
conception of practical reason to get the discussion underway.
Without straying from common sense, Aristotle himself
"defines practical wisdom as the virtue by which one deliber-
ates well: i.e., reasons well in a practical way ....21
For Aristotle, as for Kronman, practical reasonableness is
certainly not a matter of mere cleverness, or even of merely
finding the right means to a given end, but also of determin-
ing the right ends to pursue.' For Aristotle, practical wisdom
"has many complex ties to such notions as ethical virtue,
deliberation, the human good, and the mean."23 In some
significant respects, Aristotle's views are not entirely clear. For
the philosopher Richard Kraut, Aristotle thinks of practical
wisdom as a non-theoretical virtue of thought, a practical-
intellectual virtue, or even a skill, but not as a virtue of
character such as generosity or courage.24 Others, including
20 The philosopher Sarah Broadie refers to Aristotle's "discussion of practical wisdom
(phronesis) ... [as] being densely thicketed with controversy." SARAH BROADIE, ETHICS
WITH ARISTOTLE 179 (1991). Similarly, "the term 'practical reason' is not unambiguous
in [the legal] literature." Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
747, 747 n.1 (1989) (contribution to a symposium on the work of Joseph Raz). For
example, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey oppose what they recognize to be the
equivocal term "practical reason" to what they refer to as "foundationalism," which might
in turn be described as something like acontextual, ahistoric monistic universalism. See
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1615, 1646 (1987). Vincent Wellman, in contrast, conceives of practical reason,
arguably unlike Aristotle, as reasoning from given ends to appropriate means of realizing
those ends. See Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward
an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45, 46, 88 (1985). As a final example, consider
that practical wisdom, and sound practical reasoning in general, is often associated with
the idea of calm decisionmaking, but in fact emotion and feeling may lead us to insights
we would otherwise have missed. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz,
"A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason:" Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1773, 1774 (1993) ("[w] hen strong emotions are considered inappropriate, participants
in an intellectual exchange may miss the places where they need to think more deeply");
NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF VIRTUE 45 (1989)
("[w]e notice through feeling what might otherwise go unheeded by a cool and
detached intellect").
2' BROADIE, supra note 20, at 179.
2 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 54-56; HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE IDEA OF THE GOOD
IN PLATONIc-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY 165 (P. Christopher Smith trans., 1986).
2- Richard Kraut, In Defense of the Grand End, 103 ETHICS 361, 369 (1993). See also
THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON THE VIRTUES in SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I1 78 (John A.
Oesterle trans., 1984) (Aquinas as linking "prudence" to the good, along with the
secondary virtues of good deliberation, sagacity, and equitable judgment).
24 RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD 314, 322, 324, 326 (1989).
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Kronman, read Aristotle as endorsing a much stronger linkage
between practical wisdom and character.25
For our purposes, it suffices to note two points on which
Aristotle seems relatively clear. First, for Aristotle, practical
wisdom is not simply a matter of an unusual grasp of concrete
particular facts in a given historical context, or the ability to
apply such particulars. The practically wise person or phronimos
must also be capable of thinking at a broad, systematic level,
in which any relevant universal truths are sought and integrat-
ed with the relevant particulars. 26 Second, Aristotle believes,
controversially, that practical wisdom involves or implies
acquiring each and every one of the various moral virtues.
This was noted by Sir David Ross, who concisely observed that
for Aristotle, "any moral virtue implies practical wisdom and
practical wisdom implies all the moral virtues."27
Kronman does not invariably endorse Aristotle, and
thereby assume Aristotle's liabilities in all respects, especially
on issues of metaphysics. 2 But where we doubt Aristotle, we
should check to see whether those doubts encompass Kron-
man's position as well. Kronman, for example, recognizes the
See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 41; Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the
Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Laweyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995)
(practical wisdom as developed, educated moral character); JOHN M. COOPER, REASON
AND HuMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE 101 (1986) (Aristotelian phronesis as the intellectual
excellence supporting excellence of character); TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST
PRINCIPLES 376 (1988) ("[t] he Aristotelian virtue of character lies in a mean determined
by reason, and by the reason by which the wise person would determine it"). Because
moral virtue determines the principles of wisdom, Aristotle may seem caught in a rather
tight circle, with both practical wisdom and virtue being crucially dependent upon each
other. See, e.g., ANTHONY KENNY, THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN THE EUDEMIAN AND NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 180 (1978). If we
consider such circularity to be vicious, Aristotle might seek to point to a contemporary
consensus or to common sense in support of his approach.
26 See, e.g., KRAUT, supra note 24, at 330 (Aristotelian practical wisdom as requiring a
knowledge of both universals and particulars); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About
Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 717 (1994); Kyron
Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1454 (1994) (Aristotle's
phronimos as needing to know "universal truths" and to integrate the universal and the
particular).
27 SIR DAVID ROSS, ARISTOTLE 221 (1985) (1923). See also ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF
ARISTOTLE book VI, ch. 12, at 189 (JA.K. Thomson trans., 1955) (translation of the
Nicomachean Ethics) ("the soul... cannot acquire prudence or sagacity unless it has first
acquired virtue"); id. ch. 13, at 191 n.t; Huigens, supra note 26, at 1456 (Aristotle as
holding that the virtue of practical wisdom somehow implies, confers, or generates all
of the (moral) virtues). Relatedly, Aristotle also holds that the development of the virtue
of prudence requires accumulated practical experience, along with age, as opposed to
the youth of even "accomplished students." See ARISTOTLE, supra, book VI, ch. 8, at 182.
21 See infra part III.
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arguable circularity in Aristotle's suggestion that if we wish to
grasp the nature of good judgment in public affairs, we must
seek out and learn from those who have such judgment.29
Kronman refers to good judgment as less like science and
more like "aesthetic taste and style.""° But just this sort of
analogy raises the specter of the possibility that good political
judgment may be as conventional or as subjective as matters
of taste and style are often thought to be." Some may have
nagging doubts that the superiority of a famous designer's
fashion sense compared to that of a plebian may be not a
matter of some mysteriously inarticulable 32 sort of fashion
wisdom, but may in fact rest on less substantial grounds.
Consider again Aristotle's belief that practical wisdom
somehow implies the possession of all of the moral virtues.3 3
The price of Kronman's denying this claim would be another
divergence between Kronman's approach and that of Aristotle,
which tends to undercut whatever value may be had from
appealing to the Aristotelian tradition. The price of Kron-
man's acceptance of this claim, though, would be steeper.
Many persons who believe that practical wisdom is real will be
inclined to say either that some who are practically wise do not
in fact possess all of the moral virtues, or that practical wisdom
in company with all the moral virtues is so difficult to attain as
to not be worth striving for with any realistic hope of attain-
ment.
But it is also possible to doubt that there is a real virtue of
practical wisdom that transcends mere group conventions or
mere random statistical artifacts. It is admittedly still possible
to care about practical wisdom even if we think of it only as a
matter of some group convention. But to lose real or genuine-
ly objective practical wisdom seems more grievous than to lose
practical wisdom merely according to the standards of one or
more groups to which we may or may not wish to identify. A
group's losing practical wisdom from its own group perspective
may, from the perspective of another group, involve a gain in
practical wisdom by their standards. Why mourn the loss of
29 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 224.
30 Id at 225.
31 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("it is... often true that one
man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
32 See, e.g., MICHAEL POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRJTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 336 (1962).
3 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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wisdom, by our own current standards, if those standards are
not group transcendent?
It is certainly possible to deny that there is a real, relatively
stable character trait that can be called practical wisdom and
that specially accounts, beyond the roles of luck and all other
personal or circumstantial factors, for success in choosing
ends, in reasoning from ends to means, and in achieving
outcomes. "Practical wisdom" can certainly be named and
described, like bodily humours, phlogiston, or the aether.
Admittedly, the virtue of practical wisdom does seem more
commonsensical and intuitively familiar than many scientific
constructs. But common sense also weighs in, to at least some
minimal degree, against the reality of practical wisdom in the
sense Kronman wishes to use the term. This is actually a
difficult inquiry. It is not easy to control for the effects of
extraneous factors.
This is no less true of lawyers than of baseball managers.
Let us briefly consider the presumably close analogy of
practical wisdom among baseball managers. Doubtless no one
would want to say that a win-loss record over the course of,
say, the preceding year establishes one's degree of practical
wisdom as a manager. For one thing, too many other variables
come into play, swamping any effects that might be somehow
ascribed to practical wisdom or the lack thereof. Perhaps then
we should look to win-loss records over a period of, say, five
years or so, in an attempt to at least partially wash out those
extraneous factors, and to reflect the idea that practical
wisdom among managers should as a virtue be stable over
time. At least some persons, then, might have the temerity to
say that the managers with the best five-year win-loss records,
or the most championships, or some variation thereon, are the
most practically wise managers. We would be operating here
on the assumption that practically wise managers are "good"
managers, and that winning and losing games or champion-
ships over some relevant time frame, or doing better than
those managers with bigger player payrolls, is closely associated
with being a good manager.3'
"' Doubtless some managers may be asked merely to provide stability in some difficult
transition, or to rebuild a franchise with little emphasis on winning in the short term.
We may set aside such complications. Surely we would have little interest in baseball's
version of practical wisdom unless it involved, at one point or another, a payoff in
winning games. We may also note that the statistical phenomenon of regression toward
the mean can account for some tendency for an unusually poorly performing team that
replaces its manager to do better under its new manager.
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But even this presumably more suitable indicator of
horsehide phronesis seems problematic. Notoriously, the
acclaimed manager-of-the-year can, over the succeeding few
years, be discharged for, perhaps, a supposed failure to adapt
to changing circumstances. The game is said, at least for a
time, to have passed them by. Sometimes, of course, no
aspersions are cast on the capabilities of the fired manager.
Bad outcomes or bad situations are sometimes said to not be
the manager's fault. This may be true of lawyers or policy-
makers as well. But while this is indeed sometimes true, it at
best impeaches the importance of baseball phronesis. If
practical wisdom in a baseball manager cannot at all affect the
problems of, say, too many selfish, feuding, unmotivated,
uncooperative, distracted, complacent, poorly conditioned,
avaricious, technically unskilled, or underperforming players,
then perhaps in such cases we should focus our attention on
matters other than the possession of practical wisdom.
Of course, it is possible to set aside these qualms and hold
that the most statistically successful managers over some time
frame-perhaps with differences in payroll, truly unpredictable
and unavoidable injuries, and interfering owners controlled
for-tend to be those with the most baseball phronesis, even
if some of the names at the top or bottom of the list might
have seemed counterintuitive.' When we talk about those
successful managers, is it entirely clear, though, that we are
"' Query whether, for example, Tony LaRussa, Tommy Lasorda, George "Sparky"
Anderson, or Jim Leyland have, over the immediate past few years, displayed less
baseball phronesis, in either absolute or relative terms, than over the preceding few
years. Personal conversation suggests support for Gene Mauch in particular as a baseball
phronimos. Let the record show, however, that Mauch's managerial career, running from
1960 to 1987, involved 1902 wins and 2037 losses, for an overall winning percentage of
.483. SeeJOHN THORNE ET AL., TOTAL BASEBALL 2343 (4th ed. 1995). More interestingly,
members of the cognoscenti occasionally suggest that Mauch's managerial style may have
placed too much emphasis precisely on managerial strategizing itself.
More broadly, we may concede, if not insist, that real baseball aficionados will have
no truck with simple statistics, such as win-loss percentages, when more elaborate
formulae can be devised. One might, for example, assume that teams that score just as
many runs as they give up and who have managers of precisely average skill will tend to
win half of their games. One might then ascribe a team's ability to win more than half
their games, while scoring no more runs than they surrender, to exceptional managerial
ability. But managers of equal ability may have different attitudes toward blowouts, or
individual game wins and losses by large margins. And a managerial decision to sacrifice
power hitting and exceptional run production in favor of some other aspect of the game
might also simply be an unwise decision, even where it enhances the manager's standing
according to this allegedly more refined measure.
Doubtless the assertions, rebuttals, and surrebuttals in such cases will be endless.
But it is not clear how the interminability of the debate, or the indeterminacy of its
outcome, establishes practical wisdom as a stable trait of character.
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talking about their character? And when we talk about a
supposedly practically wise manager, would we also believe,
with Aristotle, that such a manager simply must possess each
and every one of the separate virtues related to managing well,
let alone all of the moral virtues that might be relevant?36
We may concede that if the more obvious extraneous
factors were controlled for, over any length of time some
managers would accumulate better records than others. Some
would, over a career, win roughly half the time, some more,
and some less. But this, by itself, would clearly not suffice to
establish the reality of practical wisdom as a stable trait among
some managers. Fair coins, we may assume, do not vary in
their practical wisdom, or in the ability to come up heads
when tossed. But given multiple tosses of each coin, twenty
coins will tend to sort themselves out into something like a
normal or bell-shaped distribution in terms of numbers of
heads accumulated by each coin. Are we sure that patterns of
baseball managers' wins or championships would not be
explainable on a similar statistical basis, or if not, that factors
not related to practical wisdom cannot account for the
departures from a chance distribution?
It is possible to argue that in fact, all major league baseball
managers possess enormous amounts of baseball practical
wisdom and are therefore all at the "top" of the distribution.
But baseball fans who believe in practical wisdom do not also
normally believe this. More importantly, Kronman certainly
does not argue that most lawyers and judges today exhibit
great amounts of practical wisdom in the legal sphere, thereby
blurring the differences between those with and without
practical wisdom. Nor does he argue that no lawyer, judge, or
policymaker today displays special practical wisdom.
All in all, our foray into baseball managing, where we
would have expected support, at least by analogy, for the idea
of the reality of practical wisdom, has instead had more
equivocal results. Perhaps "practical wisdom" is actually more
like coins' allegedly differential abilities to turn up heads on
repeated trials, or perhaps it reflects unrelated factors.
This hesitancy to accept practical wisdom as a real and
stable character trait may, however, merely provoke frustration.
s The reader is at this point invited to recall, or research, appropriate instances from
the realm of baseball. In the political sphere, the reader is urged to consider the cases
of many of Shakespeare's tragically flawed heroes, or of a number of Richard Nixon's
arguably sound foreign policy judgments in light of Watergate.
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Are there not clearly persons at the bottom end of the
distribution of practical wisdom? Can we not say, for example,
of a mass murderer as a citizen, or a virulent racist as a
detective, that they possess less practical wisdom than some
other persons? Even this remarkably understated assessment
might establish the reality of practical wisdom, as well as its
identifiability. Let us assume so. We can therefore identify
some anti-phronimoi, or those who are low in practical
wisdom. But even this may not be of much assistance with
respect to Kronman's actual project.
Kronman, after all, is most interested in lawyers and
judges who have more practical wisdom than average, not less.
And he, or we, must be able to reasonably well identify such
persons. But our ability to identify persons who are extremely
deficient in practical wisdom does not necessarily imply that
we can also identify those who have more practical wisdom
than average. There is no guaranteed symmetry here. By
analogy, even if we could identify some terribly incompetent
artists, that would not mean that our society can equally
recognize, or agree on, whether Andy Warhol, Christo,
Norman Rockwell, or Roy Lichtenstein possess unusually great
artistic ability.
Even if we, or some appropriate person or group, could
reasonably well identify one or more persons with great artistic
ability, we would still have to worry about possible differences
between recognizing great artists and recognizing one or more
lawyers who have great practical wisdom. Proceeding again by
analogy, let us think about practical wisdom in the making of
foreign policy. Notoriously, persons occupying the crucial
senior foreign policy posts, along with outside foreign policy
specialists, disagree on basic foreign policy ends and means,
for a variety of reasons. Disagreement is commonly along
multiple dimensions, and the positions endorsed may not fall
neatly into only a few categories.
Let us leave the question of practical wisdom among
foreign policy makers with a thought experiment. Consider
two possible mechanisms of deciding on a basic foreign policy
question-whether to intervene militarily in a particular
foreign conflict or not. The first mechanism would be to select
the approach endorsed by a highly placed senior foreign
policy official or specialist, in or out of government, selected
at random from the very small pool of such experienced,
seasoned decisionmakers. The second mechanism would be to
follow a reasonably fairly worded public referendum, or a
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broadly and fairly inclusive national public opinion poll on the
issue.
Doubtless we can all think of occasions in which we
thought that public opinion polls would have called for a
misguided foreign policy, at least with the benefit of hindsight.
But it is also not difficult to think of occasions on which we
thought that an Administration's foreign policy was ill-judged,
at least in retrospect. Often enough, the people are ahead of
the seasoned decisionmaking experts. Can we say, with any
confidence, that popularjudgments as to foreign policy would
have led to bad outcomes significantly more often than the
approach of a particular randomly selected seasoned diplo-
mat? But shouldn't practical wisdom tend, as a rule, to give us
better results than decisions not made on the basis of practical
wisdom?
We might attempt a similar thought experiment with
regard to domestic policy. Here, the public opinion polls
admittedly are frequently hair-raising. But then so, commonly,
is the officially selected domestic policy. There is admittedly
no guarantee that even our official domestic policy reflects the
views of those who are really practically wise in such matters,
as opposed to unwise but entrenched policymakers. But at
some point, many persons will be inclined to admit that
deciding which domestic policy option most reflects the virtue
of practical wisdom, or deciding who the domestic policy
phronimoi really are, dissolves into indeterminacy, unresolvable
wrangling, and essential contestability. It is thus at best
extremely difficult to test for the presence of real practical
wisdom in the especially controversial area of domestic policy.
Of course, all this seems rather abstract and unconvincing.
Can we not recognize persons who, in accordance with
Kronman's depiction, have relatively great capacity for both
sympathy and detachment in deliberation? 7 No doubt we
can. But even a great capacity for sympathy and detachment
in practical deliberation does not guarantee practical wisdom.
Sympathy and detachment often do not add up to or remotely
guarantee good results, even if our reasoning on ends and
means seems at the time impeccable. Sympathy and detach-
ment and bad outcomes are all richly compatible.
But over the long haul, are not our odds better if we
follow the persons with great sympathy and detachment, and
7 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 98.
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the habituated, ingrained ability to reason well about alterna-
tive possible ends and means? Perhaps, but let us close this
preliminary section with one last skeptical possibility. The
phronimos is not our only possible guide in practical-moral
affairs. Doubtless we do not want to follow those who simply
deliberate poorly. But there are also examples of persons who
are not practically wise in the senses of Aristotle or Kronman,
but who reach the right result as often. Some persons may be
simply and consistently goodhearted, yet incapable of reason-
ing well about alternative ends and means. Because of their
socialization if not their noble savagery, being unkind to
anyone, no matter how "different," is for them literally
unthinkable. Their moral judgments take the form of consis-
tent, unshakable feelings or intuitions, rather than delibera-
tion, and cannot be articulated and defended with any
sophistication by their holder. But theirjudgments may be no
less consistently right or illuminating than anyone else's."
II. DOES THE WELL-CONDUCTED SOCRATIC CASE METHOD
DISTINCTIVELY PROMOTE PRACTICAL WISDOM?
Let us henceforth assume that there is a real and identifi-
able practical wisdom, as Kronman describes it, that lawyers
might potentially exhibit. How, then, might law schools
promote practical wisdom within their students? Kronman's
emphasis, of course, is on something like the traditional
appellate case law method. Kronman argues that "whatever
other ends it serves, the case method of law teaching also
promotes the character traits of prudence and public-spirited-
ness . . . ." The case method, properly utilized, "works
simultaneously to strengthen both the student's powers of
sympathetic understanding and his ability to suppress all
sympathies in favor of a judge's scrupulous neutrality."4"
Requiring students to arbitrarily assume particular, shifting,
and inconsistent roles in advocacy and deliberation may be
initially disturbing for some.41 But through habituation, the
-" We assume at this point that the mere intuitive or trained ability to aptly and
consistently apply and even articulate a homespun rule, such as to be courteous to
everyone, does not necessarily require practical wisdom in the sense in which Kronman
uses the term. And we do not argue that such a person is as fully admirable as a
genuinely practically wise person.
" KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 154.
40 Id at 113.
41 See id. at 113-14. See also Kronman, supra note 8, at 228-29. For further intriguing
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student may come to develop both her understanding of
initially alien and implausible views, and her ability to critically
assess all views.42 Often, the student eventually recognizes
what Kronman refers to as "the incommensurability of
values."4"
Kronman's assessment of the value of the case method in
promoting practical wisdom has not gone unchallenged.
Professor Anthony Alfieri has, for example, argued that
"[t] here is scant evidence.., that the case method of instruc-
tion inculcates the character trait of deliberative wisdom."44
Professor David Luban has urged, even more strongly, that "it
is almost perverse to extol the case method of instruction as
an instrument for teaching practical judgment. 45
Interestingly, Kronman himself recognizes that traditional-
ly, practical wisdom within attorneys was instilled "by a blend
of apprenticeship and broad humanistic learning."4' And he
also might well view role-playing and simulation exercises, if
appropriately conducted, as conducive to practical wisdom
even if undertaken outside the traditional appellate case or
Socratic context. What should really be said, then, about the
value and limitations of the traditional Socratic case method
in promoting practical wisdom?
The cases, of course, are themselves usually crudely binary,
zero-sum affairs. The student can then be led to construct
multiple arguments for perhaps initially alien positions, and
then perhaps attempt somehow to weigh those arguments in
some sort of balance against a variety of opposing arguments.
Alternative factual circumstances can be posed and assessed.
Incommensurable values can sooner or later be recognized as
discussion, see Mark Neal Aaronson, Dark Night of the Soul: A Review of Anthony T.
Kronman's The Lost Lauyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1381, 1390 (1994).
42 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 114-15.
43 Id at 115.
4 Anthony V. Alfieri, Denaturalizing the Lawyer-Statesman, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1222
(1995) (reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
1' David Luban, Book Review, 105 ETHICS 947, 949 (1995) (reviewing ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION). See also
Richard A. Posner, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is
Transforming American Society, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 40 (book review of Mary
Ann Glendon) ("I do not agree that... traditional legal education actually strengthens
one's capacity for sympathetic understanding").
4KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 154.
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such. Certainly, the attitudes and beliefs of the students can
eventually be changed, for good or ill.
Beyond this, it is difficult to do more than speculate about
a special linkage between the case method and practical
wisdom. One line of speculation would go like this: by itself,
immersion in the Socratic case method as described by
Kronman does not tend distinctively to generate phronimoi in
large numbers.4 7 The Socratic case method may well tend to
engender a certain sophistication,' 8 and in at least a few cases
a sense of relativism or moral skepticism. But this method
usually underplays what would seem a crucial contributor to
practical wisdom: a wide variety of life experiences across
circumstances, cultures, and classes, extended and richly
supplemented by broad, cross-disciplinary learning. Now, this
is not easy to provide or achieve. But then, neither is practical
wisdom.
Let us briefly illustrate why the usual case method must be
supplemented with broad life experience and broader learning
if it is to specially promote practical wisdom. Consider a
Socratic rendition of, for example, the welfare rights case of
Dandridge v. Williams.49 Dandridge involves and affects some
persons who have lived the entirety of their lives under the
grimmest circumstances, in desperate, grinding, stultifying
poverty, with the most constricted, claustrophobic of horizons.
All the classroom hypothetical permutations, role-playing,
perspective shifts, and forensic gymnastics, by themselves, can
give us only a dangerous illusion that we have successfully
identified with such persons, discovered with even rough
accuracy what it is like to live such lives, and sensibly factored
those vicarious life experiences into some non-arbitrary case
outcome.
The Socratic case method may force students to, for the
moment, mentally parachute themselves into a housing
project. But if the student's own life experiences and learning
in the liberal arts are remote from chronic poverty, the
" It is not clear that, following Aristotle, we can say that our practically wisest students
possess all the virtues. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
• Without reading too much into this word's etymology.
9 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to Maryland's ceiling
on monthly welfare benefits even when family size brought a given family below
Maryland's own computed "standard of need"). Of course, the Socratic case method
often utilizes a succession of contrasting cases, but this would not seem to affect the
current argument.
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student may be better off merely keeping a respectful distance
and a sense of personal ignorance and fallibility, rather than
absurdly presuming to have sufficiently grasped what it is like
to have always been chronically, desperately poor.
Of course, judges must decide such cases, whether they
are in a position to really empathize with either of the primary
litigants, or with any other affected persons. It is difficult to
calculatedly broaden one's own actual life experiences. And
without broadened life experiences, we also have no hope of
approaching anything like real neutrality, either. It is difficult
to be neutral between what we understand and what we do not
understand, even if we imagine that we genuinely understand
both parties' positions. This means that we cannot be optimis-
tic about developing and applying practical wisdom in such
cases.
Often, then, the best we can do to prepare for such cases
is to broadly recognize that other persons and groups have
experiences that we are simply not in a position to fully
grasp.5 ° To some limited degree, but only to a limited de-
gree, we can bridge the gap by listening to the narratives of
such persons, to intermediary journalists, social scientists, and
other scholars, and by attending to the truly great novelists.51
A broad and serious exposure to such readings can sometimes
reduce our inclination to crudely universalize our own
experiences, with only minor modifications. But even the most
authentic or brilliant literature has its limits and can mislead
as well as expand our horizons. We can, for example, read Les
Misgrables with rapt attention without really appreciating what
starvation, ostracism, or the chronic fear of detection and
persecution are genuinely like.
It seems clear that a broader range of experiences and of
education are necessary if a lawyer is to be able, in any serious
sense, to live out what Kronman considers the characteristic
experience of the lawyer: that "nothing human is foreign to
-o This, by the way, does not establish moral relativism or moral skepticism, for reasons
the elaboration of which would distort this essay unduly. SeeR. GEORGE WRIGHT, REASON
AND OBLIGATION ch. 5 (1994).
51 On narrativity and the law, see, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final Chronicle:
Cultural Power, the Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
545 (1995). See also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE POOR? ch.
2 (1996). With respect to cases such as Dandridge v. Williams, the reader might begin,
perhaps, with a work like ALEX KOTLOwrrz, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY
OF TWO Boys GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991).
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me,"52 or to be "exposed to the widest imaginable range of
human hopes, follies, and accidents."53 If a lawyer, according
to Kronman, has "seen it all,"54 it stands to reason that at one
point or another, the lawyer must have been exposed to it all,
and even a full career in a law firm does not expose one to
anything remotely approaching the full range of human
experience. In particular, the practice of law hardly guarantees
any meaningful exposure to the actual lives of those who
cannot afford to pay for legal services, or to those who are
minorities or are left at the legal margins of society. There is
thus a substantial class bias inherent in generally relying on
one's legal experiences.
On these grounds, we would have expected Kronman to
ask for more law school exposure to the broad range of the
social sciences and humanities. 55 Aristotle himself recognized
the need for the phronimos to correct for the distortive effects
of cognitive and other biases,56 and this seems to require not
only experience but interdisciplinary learning as well.57
Realistically, the person who seeks practical wisdom may,
inevitably, depend on either a wider exposure to interdisciplin-
ary learning, or on a narrower such learning, and it is hard to
see the advantage of the latter in cultivating practical wis-
dom.58
An attorney's breadth of learning may well, over time, be
of real significance to the attorney's best clients. It may well be
that clients would be more inclined to solicit and respect the
judgments of their lawyer on ultimate ends, and not just on
technical means, if they thought that lawyers had been trained
not only in the bivalent adversarialism of most law school
classes, or even under the Socratic role-shifting endorsed by
52 KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 159; Kronman, supra note 8, at 231.
53 KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 159.
54Id
" See id. at 356. See also Alfieri, supra note 44, at 1223 (discussing Kronman on this
point).
56 See, e.g., SHERMAN, supra note 20, at 35.
57 See, e.g.,JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982).
" Professor Gail Heriot, following John Maynard Keynes, raises the possibility that
Kronman's phronimos may to some extent rely, in an unrecognized enthrallment, on one
or more defunct academic scribblers. See Heriot, supra note 16, at 1728 n.22. Cf Amy
Gutmann, supra note 19, at 1770-71 (recommending the teaching of deliberation in law
schools in part through teaching "more of the knowledge and understanding that is
necessary to make informed judgments about alternative legal strategies").
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Kronman, but also to understand as well as possible a wide
range of human circumstances, motivations, and perspectives.
And it is clear to Kronman that a lawyer's subjective fulfillment
may depend, in part, on the breadth of the trust and respect
for the attorney's judgment held by the client. 9
III. OUGHT WE TO PROMOTE PRACTICAL WISDOM AS KRONMAN
HIMSELF DESCRIBES AND ELABORATES THE IDEA?
Practical wisdom is, almost by definition, a fine thing. But
Kronman is again not interested merely in endorsing the
broad idea of practical wisdom. Kronman naturally wishes to
propound and endorse a more narrow, particular conception
of practical wisdom. We cannot here explore all of the
dimensions of Kronman's particular view of the acquisition,
nature, and concrete implications of practical wisdom. We will
instead merely notice, and briefly refer to, several of the more
interesting dimensions of Kronman's approach. These
dimensions we may refer to under the headings of conserva-
tism, inegalitarianism, incommensurability, "thin" fraternity,
and "thin" metaphysics. Ultimately, we may want to retain the
idea of practical wisdom as an ideal of character, but in a
version that varies to some degree from that of Dean Kron-
man.
Kronman's vision of practical wisdom is, on his own
description, conservative. In some measure, his conservatism
has an historical or temporal focus. The model of the practi-
cally wise attorney was thus formerly more viable than it is
currently.' This claim, of course, renders Kronman vulnera-
ble to charges of nostalgia and of romanticizing the history of
the American legal profession.61 Kronman could have largely
bypassed these criticisms by simply deleting the historical
dimension of his argument. He clearly could have argued
simply that for contemporary lawyers, a professional life of the
fulfilling exercise of practical wisdom is unlikely, whether or
not it was ever more likely in the past.
The more significant dimension of Kronman's conserva-
tism is his belief that practical wisdom generally counsels
59 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 128-33.
o See id. at 2-3. See also Neil Duxbury, History as Hyperbole, 15 Ox.J. LEGAL STUD. 477,
478 (1995).
61 See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Book Review, 41 LOY. L. REV. 387, 394 (1995)
(reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYR: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993)).
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respect for tradition and slow, measured, incremental change,
as opposed to dramatic, totalizing, or radical reform.62 For
Kronman, the practically wise are normally "attached to
existing institutions and inclined to alter them only through
a process of slow interstitial adjustment . -." But this is a
matter of Eradualism, and not of stasis or of wisdom without
reflection.
One response to this sort of conservatism is that it poses
a false dilemma. We do not, at least in our society, have a real
choice between gradual reform and some sort of lurching,
radical, discontinuous, totalistic change that is consciously
intended and reasonably accurately steered along predicted
lines.65 Intended change is, at best, slow and gradual. Over a
long period of time, such change can cumulatively be large.
The real problem for Kronman's thesis, though, is not this
false dilemma. Instead, it is that in order for a society to
achieve consciously intended slow or gradual change, some
leaders may have to aim at, and actually intend, more rapid
and substantial change. To achieve what is possible, some may
have to aim at what is not realistically possible. Otherwise, the
momentum for progressive change may be slowed even further
or utterly dissipated by a visionless obsession with short-term,
transitional costs.
Dr. King's Letter From Birmingham Jai 6 is valuable not
only for its ultimately totalistic vision, but for its convincing
response to the recommendations, even from some persons
reasonably sympathetic to his goals, that the civil rights
struggle be less confrontational and more willing to delay and
await a more propitious time. We may reasonably fear that if
all those who seek social justice become incrementalists, the
62 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 159, 161.
6 Kronman, supra note 8, at 225.
' Cf ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 353 (1988)
(criticizing Edmund Burke's assumption that healthy traditions involve no significant
reflection or rational theorizing). For further discussion of Kronman's conservatism in
this respect, see, e.g., Aaronson, supra note 41, at 1387; Peter Margulies, Progressive
Layering and Lost Traditions, 73 T"Ex. L. REV. 1139, 1140-41 (1995) (reviewing ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
SSee, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO &JEAN STEFANCIC, FAILED REVOLUTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM
AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-43 (1991).
66 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL (1994). See also MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964). For useful commentary, see, e.g.,
Derrick Bell, The Triumph in Challenge, 54 MD. L. REv. 1691 (1995).
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only social changes will, whatever their scope and pace, be
unchosen and unintended by those seeking social justice.
It is also worth a moment to reflect briefly on the inegali-
tarian dimension of Kronman's vision of practical wisdom.
Kronman urges straightforwardly that "some citizens have a
superior ability to discern the public good ... "67 and that
"this superiority is due to their excellence of judgment," 68
which is in turn "a trait of character and not simply an
intellectual skill." 69
We have already attempted to cast some doubt on the
genius/bum distinction among major league baseball manag-
ers and will not repeat that discussion here, other than to note
that most managers seem to be keenly aware that their status
as either a genius or a bum may vary daily or over a period of
years. More broadly, there is not much utility in a belief in the
unequal distribution of practical wisdom if the relevant parties
cannot accurately and reliably identify those with unusual
degrees of practical wisdom. Let us not forget the practical
wisdom of Thomas Hobbes:
Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes
on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto.
That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a
vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think
they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar .... [T]here is
not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any
thing, than that every man is contented with his share.7"
More disturbing, though, is Kronman's argument that
there is a tension, at least in some contexts, between strong
egalitarianism and the virtue of practical wisdom.71 If we
believe in practical wisdom, the relationship between practical
wisdom and egalitarianism is, or should be, an utterly central
question in social, political, and legal philosophy. Central
philosophical problems are usually not quickly resolved, and
this essay will make no attempt to establish an exception. We
can, however, at least state a countervailing claim: that
practical wisdom is intimately linked to strong forms of
egalitarianism, in a number of crucial respects.
67 KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 35.
M8 kL
69m
70 THoMAs HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (Prometheus ed., 1988).
71 KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 367. See also Margulies, supra note 64, at 1148.
835
CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW
We can again admittedly offer no real support here for
linking practical wisdom and strong equality. But let us at least
recall that for Kronman, practical wisdom involves habituation
not only in detached reflection, but in an unusually powerful
capacity to empathize and to sympathize. 72 It is not particu-
larly difficult for judges and lawyers to empathize and sympa-
thize with people like themselves, or with the socially respect-
ed and the well-off more generally. Unusual capacity for
empathy and sympathy is instead demonstrated, presumably,
in more fully appreciating, and caring about, what it is like to
live a life of stark, extreme deprivation or stigmatization. And
those we come to sympathize with, we may tend to more
deeply respect and provide for.
Kronman may not mean to suggest that strong egalitarian-
ism, even among relatively detached academics or among
purer activists, tends to any degree to impair the exercise of
practical wisdom. 73 Assuming this to be so, we should turn
briefly to some concededly hazy further speculation on the
possible implications of Kronman's perspective on the incom-
mensurability74 of many important choices among legal
values.
Kronman clearly believes-along with many who may be
more and less conservative than he is75 -that many apparent-
ly important moral, political, and legal choices involve alterna-
tives the value or "weight" of which cannot be placed on a
common scale, balanced against one another, or otherwise
shown to be, in themselves, rationally preferable on any
72 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 98.
71 But see, e.g., id. at 49 (discussing the "new civic republicans" as bearing an
"antipathy" to the ideas of "judgment" and of "wisdom").
7' For discussion of the problems of incommensurability in a legal context, see, e.g.,
the contributions of Professors Faigman, Schauer, Waldron, and Gottlieb to Symposium,
When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy ?: Reconciling Public Values and Private Rights in
Constitutional Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 707 (1994); R. George Wright, Does Free
Speech Jurisprudence Rest On a Mistake?: Implications of the Commensurability Debate, 23 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 763 (1990); MichaelJ. Perry, Some Notes on Absolutism, Consequentialism, and
Incommensurability, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 967, 979 (1985).
1 Value incommensurability is a major theme of writers as politically disparate asJohn
Finnis and any number of writers associated with liberal or left-egalitarianism, or with
the Critical Legal Studies Movement. See, e.g.,JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 115-17 (1980); MargaretJ. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE
LJ. 56, 66 (1993); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (1990).
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objective, non-arbitrary grounds.76 Such alternatives are thus
rationally incommensurable.
The problem in such cases, evidently, is that unless a way
can be found to rationally decide such cases,77 there will be
some tendency for persons faced with such dilemmas to adopt
not the sort of conservative traditionalism Kronman endors-
es, 78 but a form of relativism, subjectivism, or skepticism
instead.79 Kronman's own approach runs along the following
lines:
If we ask ... what it means for a person who must choose among
incommensurable goods to live well, we cannot answer, with the
Greeks, that it means to live in accordance with the truth, for if
the goods in question really are incommensurable, the truth
cannot adjudicate between them .... For us, living well can only
mean living without regret or self-deception in the full light of
our predicament.'s
This requires not just an existential act of will, but the
development of character and integrity.8 And when the
problem of incommensurability arises in the political sphere,
Kronman offers a parallel answer. Integrity is to individual
decisionmaking as "political fraternity" is to collective or public
decisionmaking when the choice is among incommensurable
values.82 Thus "[i]n the political sphere .... what makes one
judgment wiser than another when the alternatives cannot be
measured on any common scale of value is its tendency to
promote political fraternity ....83
76 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 67, 85-93, 97, 104, 117. See alsoJames M. Altman,
Modern Litigators and Lauyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031, 1035 (1994) (reviewing
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS Or THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(1993)).
77 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 85. Of course, a rational choice between
incommensurable values can be made if one adheres to a relevant, decisive background
rule. Thus, we can rationally decide between, say, increasing utility or keeping a promise
if we believe in a broader rule-perhaps that we should respect rationality within
persons-that offers an authoritative and determinate resolution of the choice between
incommensurable values.
78 See, e.g., id. at 155, 159.
' See id. at 117, 160; see also R. GEORGE WRIGHT, REASON AND OBLIGATION ch. 5
(1994).
80 KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 85. For further discussion, see, e.g., David B. Wilkins,
Practical Wisdom For Practicing Layers: Separating Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108
HARV. L. REv. 458, 461 (1994) (reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
8' See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 85-86.
82 See id. at 97.
83 Id.
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So on Kronman's view, it is the conditions of integrity
within the person and fraternity within the society that may
well stand between us and arbitrary decisionmaking. But the
specter of arbitrariness may not be readily exorcised by such
means. Let us think for a moment about Kronman's concep-
tion of political fraternity.
Kronman urges that incommensurable political choices be
resolved in favor of promoting sympathetic political fraternity.
No doubt political fraternity seems, in the abstract, a fine
thing. But, again, Kronman has something rather specific in
mind. Kronman's conception of sympathetic political fraternity
is, roughly, midway between mere tolerance of those with
whom we disagree and a deeper sort of union, identification,
or community.' Who counts as an actual or potential mem-
ber of the political fraternity must of course be worked out,
and some extreme views, on Kronman's approach, should not
be treated with sympathy.8"
Endorsing just this conception of political fraternity of
course has its obvious attractions. Any "mean" conception of
any good thing can aspire to capture most of the benefits of
its flanking extremes while minimizing their respective costs.
Kronman is doubtless right in an important sense in linking
political fraternity to preservation of the polity. 6 But a polity
might well hold together either on the basis of an even richer
sense of unity, or on the basis of mere widespread tolerance
that falls short of sympathetic fraternity. In order to decide
how disastrous it would be to fail to promote political fraterni-
ty, we would need to know how far a society can fall from
political fraternity before it descends into anything remotely
approaching chaos. After all, not every element of division,
political or cultural fault line, or change of cultural identity
involves the disintegration of that society.87
Political fraternity comes in degrees, and increasing or
decreasing political fraternity doubtless involves increased or
decreased costs in terms of other worthy values.88 For any
given degree of political fraternity, there may be particular
costs in values such as freedom or autonomy, equality, dignity,
11 See id at 93-94. See also Aaronson, supra note 41, at 1386; Alfieri, supra note 44, at
1212; Altman, supra note 76, at 1038.
8' See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 108.
6 See id. at 92.
87 See, e.g., H.LA HART, LAW, UBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
88 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 107.
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and cultural or economic development.8 9 These tradeoffs or
conflicts may well themselves involve controversial and
incommensurable choices. While we might sometimes want to
invoke the value of political fraternity to resolve other incom-
mensurable value choices, we will then invariably face prob-
lems of incommensurable choices between the value of
political fraternity and other possible values. Thus if we wish
to adequately address the prospect of relativism or arbitrari-
ness in public decisionmaking, we cannot simply count on the
value of increasing political fraternity as a touchstone.
The more intractable problems of incommensurability may
well arise even if we do not stray far from the central elements
of Kronman's approach. It goes without saying that the
development of practical wisdom is important to Kronman.
What if there arises a tradeoff between the value of political
fraternity and the prevalence of practical wisdom? Is such an
incommensurable tradeoff really impossible in principle? Are
there no tradeoffs between, say, maximizing the exercise of
practical wisdom and spreading or equalizing the exercise of
practical wisdom? What about possible, conflicts between
maximizing the exercise of practical wisdom and maximizing
the ability of the public, or some segment thereof, to freely
recognize and respond to the exercise of practical wisdom?
Now, Kronman's book is primarily a diagnosis of a
condition of the lives of lawyers and judges. It is not supposed
to be a treatise in metaethics. But unless we can make more
progress in the rational selection from among incommensura-
ble values, the thoughtful lawyer will tend to lead a life of only
such fulfillment as can coexist with much arbitrariness and
skepticism.9"
Ultimately, Kronman seems driven to a fairly deep sort of
value skepticism that extends beyond being merely reserved or
suspicious regarding allegedly universal principles or grand
abstractions, at least beyond the value of practical wisdom
itself.9 He clearly recognizes that the case method, for
example, can contribute to a degeneration of detachment and
sympathy into cynicism, indifference, moral skepticism, and
89 See id.
0 Compare the generally quite sympathetic review by Gail Heriot, supra note 58, at
1751 n.96 (querying whether the choice between Kronman's practical wisdom model
and that of the scientific reformers is not itself rationally incommensurable)." See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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egocentrism.92 He wishes to produce what he refers to as"stoics"9" rather than cynics. 4 In seeking to avoid both
metaphysics and an arbitrariness of value judgments, Kronman
is in distinguished company.95 But there is ultimately no real
grounds to suppose that we can go as far as Kronman seems
to be committed to in minimizing the role of metaphysics,
while continuing, over the long term, to feel "wonder" in the
presence of the world, or even of other people.96 "Wonder"
may require a good deal of metaphysics.
Kronman frankly recognizes that ultimately, he can offer
law students and lawyers no "good reasons" to believe, on the
basis of only an attenuated metaphysics, that problems of
incommensurability will not tend to generate currently
unattractive forms of moral relativism and moral skepticism."
Kronman can certainly hold up the model of the judicial
attitude98 and urge students and lawyers to find certain
particular legal lives to be shining and inspiring examples.99
But to decline to endorse, for example, John McCloy, Cyrus
Vance, or Paul Warnke as the most preferred legal role
models1 °0 need not reflect impudence, ignorance, or lack of
appreciation.
92 See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 117, 160.
9" But compare the Ciceronian Stoic adherence to an unchanging true and natural law,
at some remove from Kronman's approach. See, e.g., MARCUS TuLuus CICERO, ON THE
COMMONWEALTH 48 (George H. Sabine & Stanley B. Smith trans., 1960) (editors'
Introduction).
94 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 118. Cf Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567, 1605 (1985) (referring, regarding Bickel on
Edmund Burke, to the practical wisdom of the judge or statesman "who has been
immunized by a 'mature skepticism' from the temptations of metaphysical thinking").
For further discussion of Burke by Kronman, see Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1047, 1055 (1990).
95 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); Richard Rorty, Postmodernist
Bourgeoise Liberalism, 80J. PHIL. 583 (1983). But cf ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE
book VI, ch. 5 at 177 (JAK. Thomson trans., 1955) (translation of the Nicomachean
Ethics) ("[piractical wisdom is a rational faculty exercised for the attainment of truth
in things that are humanly good and bad"); Hugo Meynell, On Realism, Relativism, and
Putnam, 35 INT. PHIL. Q. 331, 340 (1995) ("human authenticity, as stringently following
evidence wherever it leads, heads toward knowledge of what is really good as well as of
what is really true, and towards action in accordance with it").
I See Kronman, supra note 94, at 1605.
97 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 160.
98 See id at 118, 160.
99 See id.
'00 See id at 11-12.
[Vol. 26:817
1996] DISTINGUISHED LECTURER SERIES-WRIGHT 841
The deeper problem, of course, is not one of disputing
over which particular lawyers have manifested practical
wisdom, or over who the best lawyers are in the broadest
possible sense. The deeper problem is instead exhibited in
Kronman's concession that such disputes cannot be solved by
recognizable forms of argument." Ultimately, Kronman's
attenuated metaphysics constricts his options to something like
describing the practically wise lawyer, on his particular
conception, and then gesturing in the direction of our
approving such a model. 2 To the question of why, rational-
ly, we should find one model more inspiring '0 3 than anoth-
er, why lawyers should ever make genuine sacrifices, or why we
should retain the idea of inspiration at all, there can be no
further response without some rehabilitation of metaphysics.
For Kronman, no less than for many others of our era, an
unattractive moral skepticism remains the frog grinning up at
us from the bottom of the mug.
101 See id. at 118, 160.
12 Compare the emotivism of Charles L. Stevenson and of Allan Gibbard as expressed
in CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944) and ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE
CHOICES, APT FEELINGS (1990).
10 See KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 160.

